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 Permit me on this occasion a somewhat personal introduction1. The origins of this paper 
which I present today go back to what was for me an illuminating experience: my reading of the 
wonderful Jefferson Lecture given by the American novelist Walker Percy (1916-90). In the 
summer of 1992 I found myself as a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University trying to write an 
introduction to contemporary philosophy of language which show how a historical 
understanding of analytic philosophy enabled one to predict that this philosophical tradition 
would undergo a renovation of a markedly pragmatic nature. At the same time, given that I 
found myself in the homeland of the founder of semiotics, Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), I was 
hoping to familiarize myself with his thought, his writings and with the scholarship that had 
recently sprung up around him. One day a lawyer friend of mine suggested that I read Walker 
Percy's lecture "The Fateful Rift: The San Andreas Fault in the Modern Mind" which appears in 
the posthumous volume of his essays published in 1991 under the general title Signposts in a 
                                                
1 This paper was presented in the VI International Congress “Semiotics Bridging Nature and Culture”, 
organized by the International Association for Semiotic Studies in Guadalajara, Mexico, 13-18th of July, 
1997 and it is to appear in Spanish in the proceedings of the Congress. My thanks are due to Itziar 
Aragués,  Wenceslao Castañares, Vince Larson, and Ralf Müller for their suggestions and assistance in the 
preparation of this text, to Kevin O'Hagan and Ruth Breexe for their help in the English translation, and to 
the Project of Research "Keys in the Thought of Peirce for Philosophy, Science and Culture in the 21st 
Century" (PIUNA 1995-97) for enabling me to participate in the International Congress of Semiotics in 
Guadalajara, Mexico. 
 
Strange Land2. That reading had an effect on me very similar to Helen Keller's remarkable 
experience with the water from the fountain, referred to so many times by Percy3. 
 
 In the reading of that text —which can be considered the intellectual last will and 
testament of Percy, at that time already very ill— I discovered the unification of my diverse 
intellectual interests that had long been pursued separately4. For some time I had been 
interested in seemingly disparate segments of our culture such as the philosophy of language, 
semiotics and the theory of communication, the argument concerning the limits of artificial 
intelligence, the possibility and limitations of mechanically processing human language, the 
attempts to teach language to primates, feral children and their linguistic capacities, the 
language of the deaf-mute, the creativity of language and even the revolution in linguistics 
provoked by Chomsky's generative grammar. My reading of that text by Walker Percy, 
physician and humanist, astonished me as it revealed as clear as day both the diagnosis of the 
most serious disease afflicting our present-day culture, and its cure. 
 
 Percy was suggesting that the unifying element in all those topics that had attracted me 
so much was to be found in the insufficiency of the scientificist narrative that, permeated with a 
simplified Darwinism, had dominated the Anglo-American academic scene during the second 
half of this century with the aim of explaining the most characteristic behaviours of human 
beings such as language and communication. The cure —in Percy’s judgement— ought to be 
looked for in Charles Peirce and his discovery of the irreducibly triadic nature characteristic of 
all linguistic behaviour: the remedy to overcome the San Andreas Fault, the gap that divides our 
culture between natural sciences and humanities, making an integrated understanding of 
human beings and their activity impossible, was to be found in "the work of a human scientist 
                                                
2 That conference was given by Percy the 3rd of May,1989 as the 18th Jefferson Lecture in the National 
Endowment for the Humanities (Washington D.C.). It was published with the title "The Divided Creature" in 
The Wilson Quarterly 13 (1989), pp. 77-87, and included by Patrick Samway in the posthumous book 
Signposts in a Strange Land (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1991, 271-291), which collects Percy's 
philosophical and literary essays not published in his books while he was alive, as well as other texts of 
his of a biographical nature. 
3 W. Percy, The Message in the Bottle, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1976, pp. 34-36 and in many 
other places. 
4 K. L. Ketner, "'That Mysterious Phenomenon': The Affect of Percy's Works upon Readers", Percy 
Symposium, 20 April 1996, Covington, La. 
 
who, I believe, laid the groundwork for a coherent science of man, and did so a hundred years 
ago"5. 
 
 Scientism, held by the Vienna Circle and its positivist heirs, became the dominant culture 
from the 1950s onwards, converting itself into materialist realism which sought to explain 
everything right now, or which trusted blindly in the progress of human reason and its ability to 
explain all problems definitively and in the immediate future. In contrast with scientificist 
optimism, post-modern thought, widespread in the last decade, has oscillated between the 
presentation of science as a mere power structure or as just another form of literature. This 
skeptical attitude can also be understood as a sophisticated form of the scientificist dogmatism 
of the Vienna Circle. The presence of both approaches is detected clearly in many broad areas of 
our culture that present a curious amalgam of vulgar pragmatism, scientificist foundationalism, 
and literary skepticism. 
 
 None the less, the recent revival of pragmatism6 also draws attention to the growing of a 
new sensibility disillusioned with the vain promises of scientificist progressivism but anxious at 
the same time, in accordance with the best philosophical tradition, to forge a future which will 
be different from the past7. The celebration of this Congress of the IASS-AIS with the theme 
"Semiotics Bridging Nature and Culture" can be considered a significant landmark in this 
process of the transformation of our culture at the conclusion of the twentieth century. In fact, a 
feature of this new sensibility is the preferential treatment it gives to our communicative 
practices, to the human ability to build bridges between both individual and cultural 
differences. Walker Percy, who considered himself a "thief of Peirce"8, discovered in the thought 
of this American philosopher some decisive keys that —in contrast to contemporary scientificist 
reductionism and literary deconstructionism— allow a better understanding of the peculiar 
nature of our linguistic activity. 
 
                                                
5 W. Percy, "The Divided Creature", p. 80. 
6 R. Bernstein, "The Resurgence of Pragmatism", Social Research 59 (1992), pp. 813-840. 
7 R. Rorty, "Philosophy & The Future", in H. J. Saatkamp, (ed.), Rorty and Pragmatism, Vanderbilt 
University Press, Nashville, 1995, p. 198. 
8 Letter of W. Percy to K. Ketner, 27 February 1989, in P. H. Samway, (ed.), A Thief of Peirce. The Letters of 
Kenneth Laine Ketner and Walker Percy, University Press of Mississippi, Jackson, 1995, p. 130. 
 
 After this broad introduction, my paper seeks to account for something which Percy 
found in Peirce in his attempt to explain human linguistic behaviour reasonably. I will divide 
my exposition into three parts, which I will have to deal with in a very concise manner: 1) 
abduction; 2) the articulation of personal creativity and community tradition; and finally, 3) the 
nature of communicative spaces. 
 
 
1. Abduction 
 
 Percy wrote that Charles Peirce's theory of abduction is a "valid and possibly useful 
strategy in approaching language as a phenomenon"9. In fact, one of Peirce's most original 
contributions —as emphasized by Gonzalo Génova10— was the discovery that besides the 
traditional methods of inference, deduction and induction, there is a third method, or better, a 
first method, which he called abduction or retroduction. Abduction is the process with which we 
engender new ideas, explanatory hypotheses and theories, both in the field of science and in 
everyday life. "Abduction", writes Sara Barrena, "is a reasoning by hypothesis, that is, a 
reasoning by means of an explanation which arises spontaneously upon considering that which 
in each circumstance has surprised us"11. The abductive inference converts what may be a 
surprising fact into something plausible upon considering it hypothetically as the result of 
applying a certain rule to a concrete case12. Deduction explores the logical consequences of 
propositions, induction is the experimental testing, but, Peirce writes, "neither Deduction nor 
Induction contribute the smallest positive item to the final conclusion of the inquiry"13. It is 
abduction which introduces innovation, which starting from facts, broadens our knowledge by 
means of explanatory theories. 
 
                                                
9 W. Percy, "A Theory of Language", in The Message in the Bottle, p. 320. 
10 G. Génova, Charles S. Peirce: La lógica del descubrimiento, Cuadernos Anuario Filosófico, nº 45, Pamplona, 
1997. 
11 S. F. Barrena, "Introducción", in Charles S. Peirce, Un argumento olvidado en favor de la realidad de Dios, 
Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico, nº 34, Pamplona, 1996, p. 33. 
12 W. Castañares, De la interpretación a la lectura, Iberediciones, Madrid, 1994, p. 146. 
13 C. S. Peirce, CP 6.475, 1908. [CP refers to Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, C. Hartshorne, P. 
Weiss and A. W. Burks, eds., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1931-58; the first refers to the 
volum, the number after the dot to the paragraph, and the last number to the year of the text]. 
 
 Abduction is not merely a "logical operation", but it is rather, from a semiotic point of 
view, that spontaneous activity of the mind which makes the strange familiar, making sense of 
what has surprised us. Of the different kinds of abduction, Percy is interested in explaining the 
phenomenon of language in the abduction that makes sense of facts by means of the simplicity 
and economy of the explanatory model14. For Percy, the conduct of giving names, habitual both 
in children and in adults, by means of which we familiarize ourselves with people and with 
things, no matter how complicated they may be, is human conduct par excellence. This behaviour 
can be understood as a habitual abductive inference through which we existentially unite 
experiences and meaning in names.  
 
 Another interesting characteristic of abduction is its creative nature. "Abduction 
concedes to the subject a maximum of freedom to explain the inexplicable credibly"15. Perhaps 
this is more easily perceived by paying attention to musement, the peculiar experience in which 
human creativity has its source. Peirce characterizes musement as a pure and disinterested game 
which has no objectives, and that "involves no purpose save that of casting aside all serious 
purpose". It has no rules, "except this very law of liberty"16. Musement is a setting free of the 
mind, which goes from one thing to another: 
 
"Enter your skiff of Musement, push off into the lake of thought, and leave the breath of 
heaven to swell your sail. With your eyes open, awake to what is about or within you, 
and open conversation with yourself; for such is all meditation"17. 
 
 For all who are listening to me, the connection between scientific abduction and literary 
creativity perhaps seems obvious; this connection has been accurately studied by D. Anderson18. 
But what I would like to emphasize on this occasion is the connection between abduction and 
ordinary linguistic activity, with speaking, writing and our communication. Common and 
vulgar speech or writing are almost always forms or processes of abduction: 
                                                
14 W. Percy, "A Theory of Language", in The Message in the Bottle, p. 321. 
15 W. Castañares, De la interpretación a la lectura, pp. 153-154. 
16 C. S. Peirce, CP 6.458, 1908. 
17 C. S. Peirce, CP 6.461, 1908. 
18 D. R. Anderson, Creativity and the Philosophy of C. S. Peirce, Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1987. 
 
 
"Looking out of my window this lovely spring morning I see" —Peirce wrote in 1901— 
"an azalea in full bloom. No, no! I do not see that; though that is the only way I can 
describe what I see. That is a proposition, a sentence, a fact; but what I perceive is not 
proposition, sentence, fact, but only an image, which I make intelligible in part by 
means of a statement of fact. This statement is abstract; but what I see is concrete. I 
perform an abduction when I do so much as express in a sentence anything I see. The 
truth is that the whole fabric of our knowledge is one matted felt of pure hypothesis 
that is confirmed and refined by induction. Not the smallest advance in knowledge can 
be made beyond the stage of vacant staring, without making an abduction at every 
step"19. 
 
 It is true that upon speaking or writing we are not aware that we abduct, but it is also 
true that "it is not necessary, in order to talk, to understand the theory of the formation of vowel 
sounds"20, and that the users of language are usually ignorant of the linguistic and physiological 
laws laboriously discovered by specialists in diverse fields. The abductive inference is for us so 
transparent, so simple and inherent, that it goes unnoticed. 
 
 
2. The articulation in language of personal creativity and community tradition. 
 
 For Percy, one of the most characteristic differences between human beings and other 
animals is that a human being "not only has an environment, as do all creatures. It has a world. 
Its world is the totality of that which is named. This is different from its environment. An 
environment has gaps. There are no gaps in a world. Nectar is part of the environment of a bee, 
cabbages and kings and Buicks are not. There are no gaps in the world of this new creature, 
because the gaps are called that, gaps, or the unknown or out there, or don't know"21. For Percy, it is 
through words that we are able to give form to the world, making it different from an 
environment (Umwelt). In a world there is space for meanings, about which we can think, 
                                                
19 C. S. Peirce, MS 692, 1901. [MS refers to the manuscripts of Charles S. Peirce kept in the Houghton 
Library, Harvard University]. 
20 C. S. Peirce, CP 4.242, c.1902. 
21 W. Percy, "The Divided Creature", p. 87. 
 
deliberate, talk and argue. In an environment there are only dyadic events, causes and effects: 
such are experiences for the rest of the animals22. But naming is an activity entirely different 
from those activities reducible to cause and effect: "Naming is unique in natural history because 
for the first time a being in the universe stands apart from the universe and affirms some other 
being to be what it is"23; "no other species on earth ever names anything at all, much less goes 
about naming everything under the sun or asking its name"24. 
 
 The spaces which naming creates are common spaces and not environments of private 
consumption, of sensations reducible to dyadic processes. "Helen Keller's memorable revelation 
was the affirmation of the water as being what it is. But an affirmation requires two persons, the 
namer and the hearer. This is water, means that this is water for you and for me. Only a person 
may say yes, and he may say it only to another person"25. For Percy, intersubjectivity is "that 
meeting of minds by which two selves take each other's meaning with reference to the same 
object beheld in common"26. We humans recognize other humans as interlocutors, as beings 
capable of sharing our understanding. "Every sentence is uttered in a community. The 
community of discourse is a necessary and nontrivial parameter of triadic behaviour"27. We who 
constitute a community share abductive habits —some habits which enable us to recreate 
abductively the rules that permit the understanding of what we say to each other28. 
 
 Intersubjectivity is the communicative space in which that peculiar articulation of 
personal creativity and tradition is produced. On the one hand, intersubjectivity guarantees the 
objectivity of the truth. If it is accepted that language is the vehicle of thought and if one agrees 
                                                
22 H. P. Mills, "Walker Percy's Philosophy of Language", 1993, p. 3. http://sunsite.unc.edu/ 
wpercy/hpm.html.  
23 W. Percy, "The Mystery of Language", in The Message in the Bottle, p. 155. 
24 W. Percy, "A Theory of Language", in The Message in the Bottle, p. 309; "Naming and Being", in Signposts 
in a Strange Land, pp. 131-138. 
25 W. Percy, "Naming and Being", in Signposts in a Strange Land, p. 133. 
26 W. Percy, "Symbol, Consciousness, and Intersubjectivity", in The Message in the Bottle, p. 265. 
27 W. Percy, "A Triadic Theory of Meaning", in The Message in the Bottle, p. 172. 
28 W. Castañares, "Lógica, semiótica y hermenéutica: El pensamiento abductivo", II Simposio 
Internacional de Semiótica, Universidad de Oviedo, 1988, vol. 1, p. 146. 
 
with Wittgenstein that there cannot be a private language, and that it is only communication 
with others that provides us with the correct use of words29, then, in the same way and with the 
same conviction, it ought to be affirmed, as opposed to the individualist cartesianism still in 
vogue, that it is interpersonal communication which provides the guideline for objectivity in the 
cognitive sphere. But on the other hand, words which are learned communally are those that 
allow us to master our biographical experience and to exercise, through their use, our personal 
creativity: we do so through abductive inferences that obtain from old words unexpected 
splendour, granting them new uses and new senses, or through our assertions, with the 
affirmations through which we express our histories and our arguments. 
 
 
3. The nature of communicative spaces. 
 
 Walker Percy's most important legacy is the affirmation that an adequate theory of 
language following the lines sketched by Peirce is capable of bridging the gap that exists 
between biology and grammar, between scientific studies and literary studies, so as to gain a 
united and integrated understanding of what we human beings are. The key is to be found in a 
proper understanding of the articulation of thought and world which genuinely occurs in 
language, since the three elements —thought, language and world— confer meaning 
respectively in their interrelation. When a two-year-old child looks at a flower and babbles "flo-
wa", he is coupling in his conduct the flower, the sound, his mother as the addressee of the 
expression, and himself as the builder of the coupling. The whole of this habitual 
communicative process cannot be explained dyadically, or if it is so explained, it is entirely 
denaturalized, making its real understanding impossible: "The triadic creature is nothing if not 
social. Indeed he can be understood as a construct of his relations with others"30. 
 
  The articulation of personal creativity and communal traditions occurs in language; the 
intertwining of emotional spontaneity and the cultural encyclopaedia of meanings also occurs in 
language. The example of the interaction between the child and his or her mother suggests also 
that we succeed in creating genuinely communicative spaces when we personally join creativity 
and tradition in our relations with others. That is why the truth is what is most communicable, 
                                                
29 D. Davidson, "Three Varieties of Knowledge", in A. Phillips Griffiths, (ed.): A. J. Ayer Memorial Essays, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 159-160. 
30 W. Percy, "The Divided Creature", p. 86. 
 
why the truth is liberating, why the truth is that which we surrender one to another so as to 
forge meaningful relationships between us. 
 
 It is the special concern of those who devote themselves to semiotics to extend new 
bridges between traditions, cultures, fields of knowledge and those people that may regenerate 
those common spaces so as to make them truly communicative. Walker Percy declared of Peirce: 
"Most people have never heard of him, but they will"31. I would be pleased if after having heard 
me speak this afternoon my listeners understood a little better the reason for that prophetic 
statement and why some believe that Peirce's thought can help us to establish those eagerly 
awaited bridges. 
 
 
                                                
31 W. Percy, "The Divided Creature", p. 80. 
